Prior research by Abney and Lauth concluded that governors were losing ground to legislatures in shaping the state budget. Goodman examined Abney and Lauth's explanations for this change and found empirical support for some but not others. This article's findings reveal that governors, as a group, have not declined in budgetary influence, although some have gained and others lost during recent decades. The longitudinal analysis arrives at two major conclusions: (1) executive-legislative influence changes that take place stem primarily from political rather than structural changes, and (2) budgetary influence is not unidimensional as governors and legislatures compete in a non-zero-sum game in pursuit of different budgetary outcomes.
W ildavsky (1988) observed that governing and budgeting are now largely the same thing. This point was confirmed by Gosling (1986) in his study of the Wisconsin budgetary process and concisely summarized by Kettl (2003, 1) : "All political issues, sooner or later, become budgetary issues." It is not surprising then that scholars have focused on budgetary influence to assess how the many changes in state governors and legislatures from 1970 on have affected the relative roles of these institutions (Sharkansky 1968; Thompson 1987; Clarke 1997; Abney and Lauth 1987, 1998; Goodman 2007) .
This consistent attention to the issue, however, has yielded inconsistent results regarding who has more influence over budgets and why. Reflective of this are two important recent studies by Abney and Lauth (1987, 1998) , followed by a more intensive exploration of their results by Goodman (2007) . Abney and Lauth surveyed top state legislative and executive budget officials in 1982 and 1994, securing their views regarding the relative influence of the governor versus the legislature. They found the number of budget officials citing the governor as most influential dropped from 52 in 1982 to 36 in 1994. This led them to conclude (Abney and Lauth 1998) that executive dominance over state appropriations, a movement begun in the early part of the century, had ended in the late 1990s.
Considering their observed differences across time, Abney and Lauth (1998) suggested a number of potential explanations for declining gubernatorial influence including declining agenda control, increasing partisanship, and increased legislative sophistication in counteracting the item veto. Goodman (2007) took up the challenge (at least regionally) of testing these propositions, finding support for some but not others based on his more extensive data. Along the way, he also found that both legislative and executive budget analysts who perceived an influence shift across time declared the governor, not the legislature, to be the beneficiary of any shift. With data covering only thirteen Western states rather than the fifty states covered by Abney and Lauth, Goodman suggested that unique patterns in the West might explain those states' divergence from the national trend.
To these prior studies, we bring both more extensive and deeper state-based data and a different theoretical perspective aimed at resolving some of the conflicting results. We rely on more than 1,000 respondents and cover the years before, during, and after the Abney and Lauth (1987, 1998) surveys. Our analysis does not reveal any consistent decline in gubernatorial budget influence. Rather, we find that governors, on average, held their own or slightly increased their budgetary influence vis-à-vis the legislature from the 1980s through the 1990s. Goodman's results for Western states were not an anomaly but reflective of this trend.
While nationwide the slope is positive, some governors have lost influence while others have gained. Goodman's (2007) analysis produced a more sophisticated understanding of forces affecting the executivelegislative budget game, but the broader question of what explains the change remains unanswered. Goodman's test of Abney and Lauth's (1998) suggested explanations used only cross-sectional data. Understanding temporal changes requires a look across time. That is what we do here. Our results show that some of the explanations proposed have merit, but not all. In addition, we differentiate the meaning of the dependent variable, budgetary influence, and argue that it can be viewed from contrasting perspectives by governors and legislators. Their different interests help explain some of the seemingly inconsistent findings by Abney and Lauth and Goodman.
Institutional Influence and State Budget Processes
In the late 1960s through the 1970s, numerous scholars commented on a growth spurt in the authority of the governorship (Sabato 1983; Beyle 1983) . With only a slight time lag, scholars also began to note the growing professionalism of state legislatures (Dilger, Krause, and Moffett 1995; Abney and Lauth 1993; Clarke 1998 ). In the 1960s, state legislatures were lamented as "poorly organized and technically ill-equipped" (Heard 1966, 151) . Their most glaring failure was the inability "to exert any really constructive influence upon their state budgets" (Citizens Conference on State Legislatures 1971, 116) . But legislative resources began to improve with only a slight lag behind growing gubernatorial authority (Sabato 1983; Gross 1989) .
Increased legislative capacity was combined with a marked increase in partisan divisions between the state executive and legislative branches (Abney and Lauth 1998; Fiorina 1994) . The picture was one of growing legislative opposition to gubernatorial initiatives, enhanced by increased institutional strength of the legislature. Earlier praise for the modernized governorship as a major political office was muted by later concerns about whether the office was holding its own or even losing ground in the budgetary arena to increasingly influential legislatures (Abney and Lauth 1998 ). Yet empirical studies of these changes produced a decidedly mixed picture. Sharkansky (1968) examined data from 1965 to 1967 on state agency budget requests, gubernatorial recommendations, and final legislative appropriations. He concluded that legislatures normally deferred to the governor in budgetary matters. Thompson (1987) replicated Sharkansky's analysis with data from 1978 to 1980 and found a minor drop in gubernatorial influence over an agency's short-term budget success and a significant decline in influence over long-term agency budget expansion.
Relying on perceptual data from each state's top legislative and executive budget officials surveyed in 1982, Abney and Lauth found "that governors have the advantage over legislatures in the appropriations process, but not by the decisive margin suggested by previous research" (Abney and Lauth 1987, 337) . Repeating their survey in 1994, they identified a declining number of top budget officials, both executive and legislative, citing the governor as most influential in the budget process. In contrast, however, Clarke, following Sharkansky's research strategy, found the tendency of legislatures "to take budget cues from the governor has not diminished" (Clarke 1997, 314) . Goodman (2007) returned to a perceptual approach but extended it to several budget analysts per state. In his thirteen Western states, he found strong support for legislative dominance in the budget process but also noted that analysts who perceived the institutional influence to be shifting identified the governor instead of the legislature as the beneficiary of any changes. Ryu et al. (2008) likewise found that legislatures followed the governor's lead in deciding on state agency appropriations. It thus remains unknown whether the legislature or the governor is currently most influential in the state budgetary process as well as which institution is gaining in influence across time.
Explanations for changes that do exist are equally mixed. Neither Sharkansky (1968) nor Thompson (1987) tested for the impact of legislative professionalism or partisanship. In Clarke's (1997) study, legislative professionalism was examined but found to have no impact.
1 For partisanship, Moncrief and Thompson (1980) determined that legislatures defer to gubernatorial budget recommendations under unified government but make more independent decisions under divided government. Clarke (1998) found much the same, and Ryu et al. (forthcoming) similarly concluded that divided government alters budgetary influence patterns among governors, legislators, and interest groups. Goodman (2007) , however, found no connection between either fully divided government or split control of the legislative branch and the governor's budget influence. One would expect higher levels of partisan conflict to lead governors toward increased use of their formal authority, particularly the item veto. Abney and Lauth (1987) found exactly this when reviewing their 1982 data, but their 1994 survey produced more muted results. Divided government was unrelated to a governor's use of the item veto except in those twelve states where governors may reduce, not just veto, legislative appropriations (Abney and Lauth 1998) . Nice (1988) found no association between divided governmenteither by itself or interacted with the governor's item veto power-and a variety of state expenditure measures. Goodman (2007) found that there was no benefit to the item veto itself but that the authority to veto appropriation language yielded considerable influence benefit to the governor.
Given the ambiguous and sometimes contradictory findings noted above, our purpose is to empirically and systematically explore the unfolding picture of legislative and executive influence over the state budget. We begin below with a review of data we bring to the issue. We then look at changes across time in the average budgetary influence of governors and legislatures. Finally we suggest, and test, possible explanations for the changes that have occurred.
Empirical Base: The American State Administrators Project (ASAP)
Our analysis draws on surveys of state agency leaders by ASAP. These are perceptual data drawn from top-level agency heads who reported on their individual agency relationships with other government actors (Brudney and Wright 2002; Bowling and Wright 1998; Wright, Cho, and Davis 2001) . The ASAP data provide regular as well as identical sets of questions posed to these executives across multiple decades.
The ASAP studies compensate for the data weaknesses of prior research in many ways. First, the ASAP data include all fifty states. In contrast, Sharkansky (1968) included only nineteen states; Moncrief and Thompson (1980) eleven states; Thompson (1987) eighteen states; Clarke (1997 Clarke ( , 1998 thirteen and twenty states, respectively; and Goodman (2007) thirteen states. Many of these limitations were due to their research strategy, comparing actual agency requests to gubernatorial recommendations and eventual legislative appropriations. As Sharkansky (1968, n. 6 ) warned in his original study, and Thompson (1987) later reaffirmed, a research approach relying on agency requests biases the sample toward nonreformed states where separate agency requests are still available rather than merging all agencies into a comprehensive executive budget.
Second, while Abney and Lauth's (1987, 1998) Finally, to examine across-time changes, it is necessary to have consistent across-time data. Abney and Lauth (1987, 1998) come closest to this, comparing their 1982 to their 1994 results, but they are able to only suggest, not test, explanations for perceived changes. Other research strategies had more limited temporal data. These were two years for Goodman (2007 Goodman ( ) (i.e., 2000 Goodman ( -2001 , four for Sharkansky (1968 Sharkansky ( ) (i.e., 1965 Sharkansky ( -1969 , three for Thompson (1987 Thompson ( ) (i.e., 1978 Thompson ( -1980 , and nine for Moncrief and Thompson (1980 ) (i.e., 1966 -1974 .
2 Furthermore, none examined changes across time within their data but rather compared their results with the earlier studies. This is particularly problematic since each study used a different state sample with fewer than half their cases matching those used by other studies.
3 It is thus impossible to determine if differences in results are due to true changes across time rather than differing samples.
In contrast, we use constant sample sets of all fifty states (and their respective scores of agencies) for a twenty-year time frame. This permits us to examine more reliably across-time changes. Our data are drawn from five replicated ASAP surveys, conducted in 1978 ASAP surveys, conducted in , 1984 ASAP surveys, conducted in , 1988 ASAP surveys, conducted in , 1994 ASAP surveys, conducted in , and 1998 . These dates neatly surround and include the Thompson (1987 Thompson ( ) 1978 Thompson ( -1980 data and the Abney and Lauth (1987, 1998) We rely primarily on four questions from the ASAP surveys. The agency leaders were asked to rate separately the governor's and legislature's influence on (1) the overall budget of their agency and (2) the budget for specific programs carried out by their agency. The governor and legislature were evaluated independently on these two items based on a four-point scale wherein the degree of influence was measured as follows:
These same questions repeated across time enable us to explore, first, whether governors have lost ground vis-à-vis the legislature and, second, what might explain changes that may have occurred across two decades.
The ASAP surveys are based on agency heads as defined in the Council of State Governments' publication Administrative Officials Classified by Function (Council of State Governments various years). Due to differing traditions within and across states, some functions may represent exceptionally small agencies while others include a vast number of employees and are allocated a substantial portion of the state's budget. Given this, it is possible that Abney and Lauth's (1987, 1998) respondents-each state's executive and legislative budget official-may have provided more general observations on the substance of each state's total aggregate budget than would a large mixture of administrators heading agencies varying widely in size. The same could be said of Goodman's (2007) analysis, based solely on executive budget and legislative fiscal analysts.
To avoid potential problems induced by varying size and aggregation effects, each of the ASAP respondents was weighted. The agency respondents were also asked to report the total number of employees and the size of the annual budgets of the agencies they headed. Using these two variables, we divided the agencies within each state into quartiles on each size variable. The smallest agencies were given a weight of 1 on each measure and the largest a weight of 4. This scoring was done separately for the agency budget and employee size variables, and the two weightings were then averaged to produce a weighting factor for each respondent. These weighted data were then used to produce means-a single score for each state in each time period-on the key variables of interest.
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Trends through Time: 1978 to 1998
The first question posed is whether and to what extent the governor's influence has declined across time, particularly vis-à-vis the legislature. The picture provided by some of the literature is of a curvilinear pattern of gubernatorial budget influence, growing through the 1970s and 1980s and declining somewhat thereafter. The ASAP data in Table 1 challenge this picture. The governor's average influence level over an agency's total budget was constant from 1978 through 1988 and then increased slightly in the 1990s. In contrast, the legislature was rated higher than governors in influence in 1978 but since that time dropped lower than governors except for what amounts to a tie in 1988. These raw results are a reversal of the Abney and Lauth (1998) finding of an "end of executive dominance."
The patterns fluctuate when looking at only the Western states examined by Goodman (2007) or when measuring influence on the budgets of specific programs within the agency. The overall conclusion is the same, however. Viewing the difference figures (subtracting the legislature's influence level from that of the governor's) reveals a predominance of negative values (legislature has more influence) from 1978 to 1988 followed by values closer to zero (tied in influence) in the 1990s. As surmised by Goodman, the legislatures in the Western states are slightly stronger in budgetary influence than in the average state, but governors in those states are sometimes more influential over the budget than is the average governor. This is not a contradiction. Budgetary influence cannot be assumed to operate as a zero-sum game between these two actors only (Dometrius, Wright, and Burke 2008) . Agency leaders, agency employees, interest groups, professional associations, and others all seek to influence the partitioning of the budgetary pie.
Whether the question deals with the total agency budget or budgets for specific agency programs, differences between the governor's overall influence and that of the legislature are modest, change only marginally across time, and tend to change in favor of the governor. From the perspective of state agency heads, each institution possesses substantial influence over its budgets, around 3.5 on a 4-point scale. Neither one, however, enjoys a "dominant" or a marked advantage. In this sense, we agree with Abney and Lauth (1998) that governors and legislatures in the 1990s are balanced in their budgetary influence. Where our results diverge is in not finding any prior executive dominance that has declined markedly.
These averages, both nationally and across the thirteen Western states, hide considerable variation both among states and within states across time. To examine in-state differences between the two actors, we returned to the individual respondent and subtracted his or her rating of the legislature from that given to the governor in his or her state. A positive value for this difference means the respondent evaluated the governor as having more influence over his or her agency's budgets than the legislature, while a negative value means the opposite. These difference values were then aggregated to produce a mean value for each state.
Theoretically, these means could range from a +3.0 (every respondent in the state gave the governor a maximum influence score of 4 and the legislature a minimum score of 1) to -3.0 (every respondent scores the legislature 4 and the governor 1). Realistically, however, the governor and legislature are always going to be big gorillas (or at least scrappy medium-sized ones) in determining budgetary outcomes. Differences of a half point or more would represent a noteworthy and consequential influence difference within a state between these two actors. Table 2 displays both the averages and variations across time.
The averages, both mean and median, stay relatively close to zero across all time periods. The ranges, however, show both considerable disparities among the states and interesting changes across time. For total agency budget influence, the strongest governor (largest positive value) dropped in influence from 1978 through 1988 but then escalated in influence through 1994 and 1998. In contrast, the strongest legislature (largest negative value) declines consistently across the five time periods for an agency's overall budget. Regarding specific program budgets, however, the strongest legislature has stayed fairly constant in influence, declining only modestly in the last survey year.
An overriding question, however, is about not variation within a time period but changes across time. To what extent does the average agency head response in each state (positive for greater gubernatorial influence, negative for greater legislative influence) change from 1978 to 1984, from 1984 to 1988, and so on? The figures in Table 3 report the changes in the fifty-state averages for the four change periods across the five ASAP surveys.
The average change across time for the states remains close to zero, as expected from figures displayed in prior tables. Nonetheless, both the standard deviations and the ranges show that in some states governors improve their positions rather substantially, and in other states the legislature does, across the time periods examined. Explaining these changes is our next task. 
Explaining Changes across Time
We begin our search for explanatory factors with two assumptions. The first is that whatever changes take place are largely due to social, political, and economic changes within the states, but not structural or institutional ones. Changes in formal gubernatorial authority-increasing the governor's term from two years to four, adding the item veto, and the likebegan in the late 1960s and were completed in most 1978-1984, 1984-1988, 1988-1994, and 1994-1998 1978-1984 1984-1988 1988-1994 1994-1998 Influence states by the late 1970s or early 1980s (Sabato 1983; Dometrius 1987 Dometrius , 1999 . Since then, structural changes have been marginal and episodic, usually involving fine-tuning the item veto (Abney and Lauth 1998; Goodman 2007) . For example, some states have added reduction authority to the earlier categorical item veto power. Others have added the ability to veto the authorizing language as well as the dollar amounts. In contrast, when Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson inflated his authorizing language veto authority to create the Vanna White veto, 5 the legislature stepped in to curtail this power. These were noteworthy changes to be sure, but not at the same level as increasing the governor's term from two years to four or greatly expanding a governor's appointment power (Dometrius 1979) .
With most of the severe restrictions in gubernatorial authority removed by the late 1970s, little room was left for other structural changes in the governorship to affect the gubernatorial-legislative budget battles after that point. We therefore expect variations in the influence of contemporary governors to be traceable either to the political environment or to the personal and political skills they bring to the office. These may amplify and enhance or degrade their formal authority (Sigelman and Dometrius 1988) . Legislatures, on the other hand, continue to experience structural changes such as modified levels of professionalism or being subjected to term limits, changes that might significantly affect their influence (Squire 2007) .
Our second assumption is that the term "budget influence" means somewhat different things to governors and legislators. Both Abney and Lauth (1987) and Goodman (2007) found that where one worked affected whom he or she saw as having the greatest influence. Legislative budget officers reported the legislature to be more influential, while executive budget officers saw the governor as having the most influence.
6 While this may be merely a manifestation of Miles's Law-"where you stand depends on where you sit" (Miles 1978; Yoo and Wright 1994 )-we feel it may reflect something important: not perceptual distortions imposed by where a respondent works but rather different views about which elements are most consequential in the vast corpus called the "state budget."
Governors are held responsible for the overall economic health of the state including unemployment, budget shortfalls, and tax increases (Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel 1995; Partin 1995; Hansen 1999) . The average legislator, on the other hand, is more narrowly and specifically focused. He or she may have some pet programs of interest but is at least equally interested in program elements affecting his or her district. Hence, a governor may have substantial control over the broad contours of the state budget while a legislator may actively seek to significantly affect state monies going to his or her district. Each may then see himself or herself as having primacy in the budget because he or she defines the focus of interest and influence differently.
The distinction in our data between an agency's overall budget and the budget for specific programs within the agency may not fully capture the definitional differences described above but can serve as a reasonable surrogate. To the extent our assumption about definitional differences is correct, we should see some differences in the variables that explain changes in these two budget influence measures. Some features that may enhance the governor's broad influence over total agency budgets and the overall state budget may contribute to less influence over specific programs and vice versa.
With these assumptions in mind, we turn to potential explanatory factors that fall into three broad categories: socioeconomic changes, political changes, and structural changes.
7 For both the independent and the dependent variables, we are looking at the four across-time changes. That is, a variable's value is derived from the prior survey year and is subtracted from the value for the subsequent survey year. For example, the governor's relative influence over the agency's total budget in a state for 1978 is subtracted from that same value for 1984. A positive result is an increase in the governor's influence across time, a negative result represents a decline, and zero means no change.
Socioeconomic changes.
In the socioeconomic category, we include measures of population and unemployment change in each state. It has long been established that political participation drops when people change communities (Verba and Nie 1972) and must learn the politics of their new environment. Newly arrived citizens will focus first on the governor, the recipient of extensive media coverage (Adams and Squire 2001) , for policy leadership. Legislative actors, creeping into the public's awareness much more slowly, will suffer in comparison. This enhances the prestige of the office, a factor Bernick (1979) found to be a more important contributor to gubernatorial influence than such items as patronage, party leadership, or bargaining skill. The population measure we use reflects mobility, the percentage of the population residing in the state for less than five years. While population change in many states is slow, this is not universal. Nearly one-quarter of the states increased their population 20 percent or more between 1990 and 2000, with Arizona increasing by 40 percent and Nevada an amazing 66 percent. The rapidly changing electorates of such states could be a resource for governors in their dealings with the legislature.
Second in this category is unemployment. Research on the governorship has established that voters hold the governor at least partially responsible for the state's economic health (Hansen 1999; Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel 1995; Atkeson and Partin 1995; Crew et al. 2002) . When unemployment rises, the governor's political clout declines, while an unemployment drop should enhance it.
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Political changes. In the political realm, we look first to changes in the governors themselves, both party affiliations and individual governors. On average, Republicans run on low-tax, low-spending, governmentefficiency platforms. Republican governors, then, may give far more scrutiny to budgetary issues than Democratic ones. We measure this possibility through a simple trichotomy taking the value of +1 if the governor changed from a Democrat during the prior period to a Republican during the current period, -1 if the switch was from Republican to Democrat, and 0 if there was no change in the governor's party affiliation, regardless of what that affiliation was.
Second is a dummy variable scored 1 if the governor of the current period is different from that of the prior period, regardless of party, and 0 otherwise. Some research (e.g., Beyle 1992; Hansen 1999; Crew et al. 2002) has suggested that governors, like presidents, encounter a honeymoon period followed by a consistent decline in popularity. If so, a long-serving governor may have less influence than a new one. In addition, a new individual in office would be interested in putting his or her stamp on state policies while a governor long in office may be operating on cruise control, maintaining programs adopted earlier but not pushing an extensive new agenda.
Another political factor, control of the legislature, has been argued by many to be of critical importance to a governor's influence (Abney and Lauth 1998; Moncrief and Thompson 1980; Clarke 1998; Ryu et al. 2007 ). Our beginning measure of legislative control is a trichotomy having the value of 0 if the governor's party controls neither legislative house and a value of 1 or 2 if the governor's party controls one or both legislative houses, respectively. Our interest, however, is in change (current value minus prior value), so the legislative control change variable ranges from -2 (controlled both houses in the prior term but none now) to +2 (controlled neither house in the prior term and both now).
The final political factor is interparty competitiveness. When party competition is high, legislators are apt to be less inclined to be viewed as mere rubber stamps for the governor. They will likely stake out policy turf different from that of the governor and defend that turf vigorously. While particularly true when the executive and legislative branches are controlled by different parties, it would also affect legislators who share the governor's party. Any legislator facing a competitive electoral arena may wish to demonstrate to the voters his or her ability to get things done for the district regardless of the governor's agenda. Hence, we expect that increased political competitiveness will lead to greater executive-legislative battles over all political issues, including budgetary ones, decreasing the governor's influence.
Unfortunately, common measures of political competition (e.g., Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993) are restricted to limited time periods. Hence, for an across-time measure, we use the surrogate of voter turnout since greater interparty competition is strongly associated with increased voter interest and thus increased turnout.
9 A change in turnout across time should reflect a change in electoral competitiveness.
Structural changes. We agree with the host of other scholars cited earlier that structural changes in the governorship are likely to be modest from the early 1980s onward, yielding only marginal amounts of increased budgetary influence. But this claim should be checked rather than assumed. We do so by examining the one gubernatorial authority that has undergone some degree of change, the item veto. The item veto itself has changed little across the time periods of this analysis-those possessing the authority in 1998 are pretty much the same governorships that had the authority in 1978. Override requirements did increase slightly as the years progressed, with a few governors moving to the higher override hurdle of a required two-thirds vote of elected legislators. There was a slight decline beginning in 1994 in governors who could reduce appropriations versus the categorical power of the normal item veto. The greatest change was a substantial increase from 1978 to 1994 in governors who could veto appropriation language along with dollar amounts. By 1998, however, some governors lost this authority, no doubt due to concerns over the creative use of this power by Governor Tommy Thompson. To measure changes in this gubernatorial power, we use a common index (e.g., Beyle 1983 Beyle , 1999 ) of 0 for no item veto, 1 where a simple majority can override the veto, 2 for a 60 percent elected (or two-thirds present) override requirement, and 3 where the override requirement is two-thirds elected or greater. 10 We differ, however, in adding to this index the same distinctions for the authority to reduce appropriations and veto authorizing language. Our measure uses values 4, 5, and 6 for the same override requirements above when the governor possesses reduction authority and then values 7, 8, and 9 if the governor can also veto the authorizing language.
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From the governor's authority to that of the legislature, we incorporated Squire's (2007) measure of legislative professionalism. 12 Squire's measure includes legislative salary, session length, and staff resources. Thus, it captures one of the key items Goodman (2007) found to be important, an independent source of information provided by a legislative budget agency. Squire's professionalism measure incorporates the total resources available to the legislature, and a legislature with more resources will surely have information sources independent of the governor about all matters, including the budget.
We do not, however, include all changes in legislative professionalism across time. Many states have stayed at exceptionally low levels of professionalism throughout the entire time of our analysis. From 1979 through 2003, Squire's (2007) professionalism measure ranges in value from a high of .626 to a low of only .027. Changes of, say, .050 may be important if a legislature is moving from .475 to .525 (or vice versa), but moving from an extremely low .06 to a still exceptionally low .11 is likely to be a change of little consequence. Hence, we restrict our measure of professionalism changes to those twenty-six states that at some point during the time period of our study had a professionalism value of .200 or greater. The remaining twenty-four states were scored 0 on the change variable.
Last in the structural category is a dummy variable having the value of 1 if the state has adopted legislative term limits. 13 States with term limits have experienced substantially increased turnover among legislators, including legislative leaders who are often able to serve in their leadership role for no more than a single two-year term (Bowser 2003) . This drop in legislative expertise could well restrict the institution's ability to bargain with the governor regarding complex programs. Few processes in state government are more complex than the budget. For example, legislatures have learned to use detailed language (Goodman 2007 ) and lump-sum appropriations (Abney and Lauth 1998) to undermine the impact of a governor's item veto. This comes only with the experience that could be lost under term limits. The dummy variable takes on a value of 1 in the year term limits are adopted rather than the year they take effect since prior research has shown legislators in term-limited states behave strategically. Knowing they will eventually be term-limited, they often run for other offices when an opportunity, such as a retiring incumbent, appears, before reaching their term-limited year (Steen 2006) .
Beyond the specific relationships identified above, we also have expectations for the explanatory models as a whole. One is our assumption that structural changes in the governor's formal power are less important than they used to be. This leads us to expect three things from the models: (1) modifications to the item veto will contribute little if any additional influence; (2) socioeconomic and political changes will, on average, be more important than structural ones affecting the governor, and (3) if much of the variance in influence comes from personal skills governors apply to their existing structural authority, that variance will not be captured in our models. The R 2 should be unimpressive. Next, we assume that legislative budget influence is more focused on specific program budgets than would be true of gubernatorial budget influence. This leads us to expect that factors contributing to gubernatorial influence-population mobility, unemployment change, a change in governors or a governor's party, item veto improvements, restricting legislative terms, and enhanced legislative control-will have less of an impact on specific program budgets than on an agency's overall budget. On the other hand, items that might enhance legislative influence-enhanced competitiveness and improved legislative professionalism-should have a greater impact on specific program budgets than overall agency budgets. The more professional a legislature, for example, the more individual members will want to make their jobs into careers (Fiorina 1994) . Doing so requires service to their constituencies. That means manipulating the details of state programs to provide and claim credit for benefits to their districts. Similarly, a more competitive electoral environment should lead legislators to expend considerable effort on constituency service.
The Model and Results
The results in Table 4 confirm several, although not all, of our expectations.
14 Turning first to the overall agency budget model, socioeconomic changespopulation mobility and unemployment-are not significant predictors of gubernatorial influence. Neither are the structural elements of an item veto, legislative professionalism, and term limits. The lack of importance to the item veto was expected, and the insignificance of term limits is not surprising. While term limits should, in theory, hurt the legislature and thus benefit the governor, numerous studies have found the impact of term limits to be quite muted (Powell 2008; Wright 2007; Schraufnagel and Halperin 2006) . It may be, as Bowser (2003) argues, that enhanced training legislatures have provided for new members mitigates some of the problems introduced by term limits.
We expected some moderate impact from legislative professionalism, and the lack of any such effect is somewhat surprising. On the other hand, it is important to remember that this is a change model. Disparities in levels that may exist cross-sectionally could be important, while changes in the same factor across time, particularly if evolutionary instead of revolutionary, might be much less so.
Along with the expected lack of significance for the item veto, we find the expected impact of political changes. This supports our overall view that structural changes in the governor's formal powers have leveled out, at least for the time being, leading to the importance of the political skills a governor brings to the use of those powers. We suspected that any change in the governor might produce enhanced emphasis on and influence over the budget, but this is not the case. However, a party change by the governor is important, confirming our expectation that Republican governors are likely to pay more attention to budgetary control than do Democratic ones. Expanded control of legislative houses by the governor's party also yields the expected benefit to the governor, while increased political competition (turnout) makes legislatures more resistant to the governor's budget preferences.
A note on the year dummies: the constant, representing the excluded year of 1984, is sizably positive. This probably reflects some last remnants of structural enhancements in gubernatorial authority that took place between 1978 and 1984. In both models, each of the three dummy years has a negative coefficient. Since the dummy variable is added to the constant for each of these years, they essentially change the constant to approximately zero. Only the 1978 to 1984 change (constant) is a significant change across years. The remaining year dummies show virtually no change from 1984 on.
Turning from the agency budget model to the program budget model, we find our contention that governors and legislatures seek different things from the budget largely, although not universally, confirmed.
We argued that variables contributing to a governor's influence would have a lesser impact on program budgets than agency budgets. The drop in coefficient size for legislative control change is too minor to claim support for our position. We furthermore expected increased competition to be more important for program budgets, but it is not. On the other hand, the lack of statistical significance in the program budget model for changing governors and switching from a Democratic to a Republic governor is consistent with our expectation.
Most important are the differing values for legislative professionalism. Enhanced legislative resources do allow the institution to restrain the governor's budgetary influence. For the agency's overall budget, we find the expected negative sign, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. For specific program budgets, however, the relationship is both significant and quite sizable. This is the strongest confirmation that legislatures use their influence to protect or promote discrete constituency programs while allowing the governor somewhat greater impact on the broader elements of the budget. 
Conclusion
We launched this analysis by questioning the view that gubernatorial budget influence had declined significantly in recent years. We also questioned whether existing cross-sectional studies could explain changes that were taking place. Our data provide support for both positions. We found differences in gubernatorial budget influence from 1978 through 1998 to be rather minor and often favoring, rather than disadvantaging, the governor. Furthermore, if we look at explanatory factors dynamically across time, we reach different conclusions from static cross-sectional analyses such as Goodman's (2007) . For example, we find that changes in legislative control are important, while changes in such gubernatorial powers as the ability to item veto authorizing language are not.
Most importantly, we do find support, although mixed, for our contention that governors and legislatures try to accomplish different things in the state budget. Surely both are interested broadly in state policies and will do battle over various policy elements. But in this battle, compromise is possible because each institution's agenda, along with some competing ingredients, also contains items of different importance. A governor knows that he or she is likely to take the bulk of the praise or blame for the big-picture element of the state's overall financial status. Legislators, on the other hand, can sacrifice some policy preferences as long as they can glean other items, especially from budget specifics, for their constituencies that can cushion their reelection prospects.
Our findings also add context to some of Goodman's (2007) results. For example, he obtained a puzzling finding that pork barrel spending by the legislature enhanced the governor's budget influence. He suggested bargaining might explain this curious result. The governor yields on some pork items in exchange for legislative support for items on the governor's agenda. Goodman's data, and his interpretation, are eminently consistent with our argument, bolstered by findings that governors and legislatures focus on different elements of the budget. Future research into comparative institutional influences should explore this prospect further. Continuing to treat budgetary influence as unidimensional, and a type of zero-sum game, may compare apples with oranges. This is especially the case if the two institutions define the terms and the games differently. Notes 1. In a different analysis of these data, Clarke (1998) found the collinearity between legislative professionalism and gubernatorial authority to be excessive, prohibiting the inclusion of both in his model.
2. Clarke's (1997 Clarke's ( , 1998 two studies covered ten years (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) , but he was investigating different questions from the others and consequently did not do an across-time analysis within his data either.
3. The Moncrief and Thompson (1980) study included only four of the same states as Sharkansky (1968) and seven different states. The Thompson (1987) 4. Our goal is to estimate the governor's and legislature's influence over the totality of the state budget. Respondents were not asked to provide their assessments of this totality but rather the influence of these two actors over their specific agency budgets. Hence, we believe that weighting the respondents as described is conceptually necessary to obtain a valid measure of influence over the total budget. Otherwise we would be treating, for example, influence over the tiny budget for the state's library as equivalent to influence over the huge budgets for state health or highways agencies.
Empirically, however, the differences are small, indicating that leaders of small and large agencies have near identical views of institutional influence. Below are both the weighted and unweighted means for our key measures across three time periods. Despite the negligible differences, we stay with the conceptually superior weighted measures.
5. Governor Thompson used his ability to veto authorizing language to veto words and even letters within words of the authorizing language to totally change its meaning.
6. In Abney and Lauth's (1998) 1994 study, the respondents were more balanced.
7. Data for the independent variables described in this section come from the State Politics section of the State Politics and Policy Quarterly data site (http://www.ipsr.ku.edu/ SPPQ/datasets.shtml) for population mobility, unemployment, and turnout; from Squire (2007) 9. The State Politics and Policy Quarterly data site provides annual turnout data drawn from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (www.census.gov/compendia/statab/). The turnout data consist of the percentage of eligible voters casting ballots in races for the U.S. House of Representatives in each state every two years. We hold these data to best reflect the environment of state legislators, many of whom also have two-year terms. Combined with the American State Administrators Project data, there are some large swings in turnout, ranging from a low of a 19 percent decline to a high of a 25 percent increase, because some comparisons are between presidential and off-year elections (e.g., 1984 versus 1978) . However, such swings are a real part of the electoral environment state legislators face. Overall, the turnout change variable is quite well behaved with a mean near 0 (-.14) and a realistic standard deviation of 9.7.
10. Data for Beyle's (1983 Beyle's ( , 1999 ) measure and our own are drawn from the relevant years of The Book of the States (Council of State Governments various years).
11. We experimented with variations of the item veto measure, including using dummy variables for budget reduction and language veto authority. None of the variations produced any change in the results.
12. Squire's (2007) data cover the years 1979, 1986, 1996, and 2003 . We used his 1979 data for our 1978 survey year and then used interpolation to produce values for 1984, 1988, 1994 , and 1998. Squire's measure also incorporates values for the U.S. Congress as a denominator, producing a somewhat moving target for legislative professionalism in the states across time. Nonetheless, Squire demonstrated that the correlation between a state-specific and his Congress comparison measure is .9 or above.
13. Because our focus is term limits' detracting from legislative expertise, we do not include Louisiana, Nevada, or Wyoming. Each allows generous twelve-year terms per chamber, more than adequate to preserve expertise in the legislative institution.
14. Table 4 is an ordinary least squares model with panel-corrected standard errors. In cross-sectional time series, some scholars include control dummy variables for the cases (states) as well. We join with many other state politics scholars in holding that state dummies tend to control for the very differences we are studying; thus, we do not use them for the models in Table 4 . However, we did run models incorporating dummy variables for the states as a check on our results and found no significant difference affecting any of the conclusions in this article. For the overall agency budget model, the differences were the following: the legislative professionalism coefficient changed its sign from negative to positive but remained statistically nonsignificant, the coefficient for unemployment increased from .015 to .019 and became significant at the .10 level, the constant was no longer statistically significant, and the R 2 increased to .249. No state dummy was statistically significant. For the specific program budget model, the differences were the following: the constant was no longer statistically significant, the R 2 increased to .206, and the coefficient for the State of Wisconsin dummy variable (+.177) was significant at the .05 level.
15. The low R 2 s for each model are consistent with other analyses of this type. Sharkansky (1968) , Moncrief and Thompson (1980) , and Thompson (1987) all focused on the existence or nonexistence of paths between variables and did not report R 2 s for their models. Clarke's (1997 Clarke's ( , 1998 analyses reported R 2 s across his models ranging from a low of .13 to a high of .27. In his models, he included dummy variables for each state. When we did the same (note 14), our R 2 s were a very comparable .25 and .21 for the overall agency and program budget models, respectively.
